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SACRIFICING ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS FOR SELF-PRESERVATION 
 
CHANGING COURSE TO STAY IN POWER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA: 
A COALITION THEORY PERSPECTIVE 
 
Steven Conaton 
 
For several weeks in the summer of 2012 the University of Virginia became the center of 
national media attention in America because of the forced resignation of the university’s 
first female president. Teresa Sullivan, a highly reputable academic administrator, had 
been hired as president in 2010 with a 5 year contract by the unanimous decision of the 
Board of Visitors, UVA’s formal leadership body. Yet on June 8, 2012 the Board of 
Visitors forced Sullivan to resign from her position as president by a vote of 15 to 1—
without any warning or prior indication of dissatisfaction. The firing of an elite public 
university president without warning was unprecedented and the shock of this decision 
was exacerbated by the Board’s initial statement which failed to indicate any specific 
reasons other than “philosophical difference[s]”.1 In the weeks that followed, an intense 
backlash led by faculty and students demanded Sullivan’s reinstatement and led the 
Board to unanimously rehire Sullivan on June 26. The incredible speed of these events 
leads to a salient question: how and why did the Board so drastically change their minds 
on such an important decision in less than three weeks? I will analyze the events of the 
UVA presidential crisis through the lens of coalition theory to show how the interactions 
between core members, players, and tag-alongs in the Board, faculty, and students rapidly 
dissolved one set of coalitions to form a new one in response to the crisis. 
 
The Coalition to Remove President Sullivan 
 
While the sudden demand for her resignation may have surprised Sullivan, the decision 
had been in the making for several months prior to the June 8 announcement. Over the 
course of the two years that she had served as president, Sullivan increasingly came into 
conflict with the rector (leader) of the Board, a real estate developer named Helen 
Dragas. Although Dragas was part of the unanimous hiring decision in 2010, by 2012 she 
had become frustrated with the university’s precarious financial situation and lack of 
progress on Massively Open Online Courses (MOOCs) as compared with other elite 
universities. In April of 2012 Dragas wrote to the vice-rector that she was “growing 
increasingly nervous that others are thinking about big trends and long-term prospects for 
higher education delivery and funding.”2 Adding to Dragas’s concern, in May she 
received a letter from a group of 450 faculty members complaining that faculty salaries 
had fallen well below UVA’s competitors and demanding “urgent and immediate 
action.”3 Believing her concerns to be endorsed by a coalition of faculty members, 
Dragas began assembling a coalition of Board members to make a decision to remove 
Sullivan from office. 
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In this coalition to terminate Sullivan, Dragas was the core member who sought to recruit 
enough other members of the Board to form a dominant coalition. Although it is difficult 
to know exactly what method of negotiation Dragas employed, it appears likely that there 
was a degree of log-rolling by other less-invested Board members. Dragas’s strong 
feelings about the future direction of the university with regard to MOOCs and new 
technology likely lead her to “overstate the consequences of coordinated action”4 and 
press the case that removing Sullivan would allow them to hire a new president that 
would resolutely move the university to the cutting edge of that new technology. Because 
12 of the 16 board members had been appointed while Sullivan was already UVA 
president, some of those members were likely attracted by the prospect of getting in on 
the ground floor of a new president search and have an opportunity to “shape [the 
coalition’s] agenda and platform”5 to their own benefit. By June Dragas had recruited 15 
of 16 Board members to her coalition and was able to move forward with her initiative to 
remove President Sullivan. 
 
The Coalition of Opposition 
 
Dragas believed that the faculty who had lobbied for higher salaries would support the 
ouster and join her own coalition to move in a new direction. However, the UVA faculty, 
consisting of about 1,800 full-time instructors and researchers, reacted to the news of 
Sullivan’s resignation with “real outrage.”6 The sudden ouster of a president with an 
academic background incited suspicion that the Board intended to fundamentally change 
the status quo of the university. While Dragas publicly stated that an increase in faculty 
salaries might occur when she hired a “stellar new president”, this failed to move faculty 
members to join her coalition because the action of the sudden firing signaled a threat to 
academic job security. 7 Even the remote possibility of weakened job security far 
outweighed the potential benefits of higher salaries for most faculty members (Kahneman 
and Tversky’s Prospect Theory provides some insight into the motivating power of the 
fear of loss over the possibility of gain).8 Coalition theory is reflected in this situation as 
the faculty members who initially tried to form a coalition with Dragas to demand higher 
salaries quickly abandoned her when she took action, and their “post-decision 
disappointment” lead to the “dissolution [of the coalition] during implementation.”9 
Within days the Executive Council of the Faculty Senate released a statement opposing 
Sullivan’s removal.10 
 
This decisive alignment of faculty leaders with President Sullivan laid the groundwork 
for an opposition coalition, which itself began the process of log-rolling; the following 
day thirty-three faculty department chairs and program directors signed and sent a letter 
to the Board protesting the ouster and demanding action to “reopen discussion” on the 
decision.11 This opposition coalition quickly gained traction and additional members as 
the national news media began to cover the unfolding story and reporters descended on 
the campus. A large group of students on the campus also joined in this new coalition, 
gathering over 2000 signatures on a petition and launching a 3000 member Facebook 
protest page to demand the reinstatement of President Sullivan, despite the majority of 
students being absent for the summer break.12  
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Many of these new student and faculty coalition members joined as tag-alongs; the 
petition and Facebook page are representations of the symbolic benefit of joining the 
organization—students saw the sudden ouster “as important and join[ed] to show that, 
but they [did] not have the resources to devote core membership activities to it.”13 Most 
of these students were a part of the coalition but, being far removed from the levers of 
power they had very little opportunity to influence the agenda other than to generally 
pressure the Board of Visitors. Nevertheless, the ever-growing group of thousands of 
students and faculty members were unified in their desire to see President Sullivan 
reinstated. Coalition theory is helpful in understanding how this group of individuals with 
vastly disparate interests (salary, research, coursework, campus life, etc.) could so 
quickly and so firmly come together in support of a single issue. 
 
Collapsing and Reforming Coalitions 
 
As the opposition coalition grew in size and furor, the coalition of 15 Board members 
who voted to terminate Sullivan in the first place began to fracture. Although the core 
members lead by Dragas attempted to move forward in the search and hire of a new 
president in order to attract more support, the opposition pressure overwhelmed the less-
committed tag-along Board members. Those tag-alongs, who were initially “willing to let 
others use their name” to enjoy the benefits of association, recognized that the negative 
publicity raised by the opposition coalition was damaging their own interests.14 They 
began to look for a way out of the coalition, but were not yet willing to leave a majority 
position of power on the Board to be a part of a powerless minority opposed to the 
termination.  
 
With an opposition coalition of faculty, students, and increasing numbers of outside 
groups supporting her, Sullivan reemerged to take a leadership role by speaking at 
protests and giving interviews with news media. Thousands of people attended a student-
organized “Rally for Honor,” staged at the UVA campus on June 24, that featured 
speeches by prominent faculty and Sullivan herself demanding action by the Board.15 
Many of these speeches were intended to not only generate support for the opposition 
coalition, but primarily to sway wavering members of the Board of Visitors to change 
sides. There was a focus on issues that aligned with the interests of Board members, 
promising that the university would emerge stronger if they reinstated Sullivan.16  
 
With tag-alongs searching for an exit, the pressure from the opposition coalition began 
mounting on Board players as well. The governor of Virginia at the time, Bob 
McDonnell, publicly demanded that the Board make a “final action” at a June 26 
meeting, or he would “ask for the resignation of the entire Board.”17 At the same time, 
faculty members in the opposition threatened to quit their posts, raising the possibility of 
an “exodus” from UVA, the negative consequences of which would have far outweighed 
the potential future benefits of a new president of their choosing. As the players and tag-
alongs saw that the existing coalition no longer served their interests, they aligned 
themselves with the opposition and prepared to vote to reinstate Sullivan at the June 26 
meeting. With a substantial number of Board members leaving Dragas’ coalition there 
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would have been no point for her and the other core members to maintain their original 
position. The threat of a forced resignation of the entire Board was a powerful motivator 
for all members of the Board to reach a unanimous resolution; even if Dragas and her 
core allies had to capitulate, that would still serve their individual interests better than 
being forced to resign.  
 
Underlying Interests Exposed Through Coalition Theory 
 
At the time, the Board’s unanimous decision to reinstate Sullivan was seen as a shocking 
turnaround from the 15 to 1 vote to terminate her three weeks earlier. This sequence of 
events is representative of the fragile nature of coalitions, as the disparate interests of 
independent actors can be circumvented in the pursuit of a common goal. Yet these 
coalitions can just as easily dissolve as actions clarify the implications of this pursuit. In 
this case, members of the Board had unique goals but voluntarily agreed to form a 
coalition to remove Sullivan—even if her removal wasn’t a primary goal of every 
individual in the coalition—to be in a better position to achieve their individual goals in 
the future. Those individual goals may have been served by helping select a new 
president or even being a member of a Board that was willing to make tough decisions, 
ensuring that their vote for future influence would have been a “mutually acceptable 
trade.”18 However, the voluntary nature of this coalition was brought into relief as outside 
pressure raised the possibility that Board members might not achieve their individual 
goals. Coalitions “start strong and end weak,” and this was exactly the case as the 
Board’s initial enthusiasm for finding a new decisive president waned in their recognition 
of the overwhelming opposition.19  
 
Coalition theory then offers a unique perspective through which to view this crisis—one 
where the narratives offered by different stakeholders can be stripped away in order to 
identify the underlying interests guiding the shifting allegiances of multiple actors. Actors 
in a coalition bear allegiance to self-interest and self-preservation above all else, and the 
UVA crisis underscores that allegiance as all of the actors gave up individual goals at 
some point to maintain or retain their position of relative power. Sullivan was reinstated, 
but at the same time all of the Board members, including Dragas, retained their positions 
and agreed to forge ahead in a new coalition despite the animosity induced by the crisis. 
Ultimately, the Board and Sullivan agreed that their individual goals would be best 
served by putting the crisis behind them and working together again. None of these 
actions served organizational goals, and they are incomprehensible when viewed through 
a traditional rational actor model—these inconsistent choices were clearly not the result 
of any unified actor making a probabilistic cost-benefit analysis. Although organizations 
are often viewed as rational actors who make strategic decisions, cases like the UVA 
crisis make it abundantly clear that the organizational leadership is ultimately comprised 
of individual actors who often sacrifice ideals and organizational goals to retain their 
positions of power. ℵ 
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